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THE CONSTITUTION AND ON-SITE 
INSPECTION 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . . 
U.S. Const. amend. IV 
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America .... [H]e shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed . . . 
U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1 & 3 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After years of thrust, feint, and parry/ an agreement be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union banning all inter-
mediate-range and short-range nuclear weapons was signed by 
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Washing-
ton on December 8, 1987.2 Besides eliminating an entire category 
of nuclear weapons for the first time ever, the United States and 
the Soviet Union will also introduce an unprecedented innova-
tion in arms control verification measures: intrusive, on-site in-
spection (OSI).3 Although for some time OSI seemed little more 
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. J.D. 1977, Wayne State Uni-
versity School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. 
1. See S. TALBOTT, DEADLY GAMBITS 21-208 (1984). (Since the inception of nuclear 
weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have attempted to gain the upperhand 
in the struggle for nuclear weapon supremacy). 
2. DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1988, at 24. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 6; 
Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 3. 
3. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 10-12. See Dean, Military Security in Europe, 66 
FOREIGN AFF. 22, 25 (1987) [hereinafter Dean], where the author comments that "the 
verification measures which the Administration has proposed - and which the U.S.S.R. 
seems likely to accept -. . . will break new ground in allowing on-site inspection. . . . 
With that new ground broken under the INF agreement, the author foresees that its 
stringent verification requirements should open the way for measures to verify reduction 
of conventional forces as part of a future Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions agree-
ment between NATO and the Warsaw Pact." Id. at 35. 
The Soviet Union has accepted one other on-site monitoring provision to date, that 
being the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) concluded in 1976. Article IV of 
the PNE Treaty authorizes temporary, on-site inspection of peaceful nuclear explosions; 
however, the Soviet Union has never declared an intention to conduct the type of explo-
sion that would trigger such inspection. See Utgoff, On-Site, Automated Monitoring; An 
Application for Reducing the Probability of Accidental Nuclear War, in PREVENTING 
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than a stalking horse in the intermediate-range nuclear force 
(INF) talks, in the end OSI became the centerpiece verification 
measure in the INF treaty! In a dramatic break from past prac-
tice, compliance with an INF treaty will thus be verified by 
methods other than national technical means (NTM) of verifica-
tionll enshrined in SALT I and SALT II.6 With the stroke of a 
pen the Soviet Union and the United States have repealed de-
cades of history by authorizing reciprocal on-site verification.' 
Considering the high probability that OSI will re-emerge as 
an issue in future arms control negotiations involving other 
weapon systems,S the issue of OSI transcends the INF negotia-
NUCLEAR WAR 126, 127 (B. Blechman ed. 1985) [hereinafter UTGOFF]. 
4. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 24; see also CHRISTIAN SCI MONITOR, Oct. 22, 
1987, at 8 ("[Secretary of State] Shultz indicated that differences remain with the Sovi· 
ets over the process of destruction of the INF warheads and the inspections that would 
be permitted in order for both sides to verify the treaty."). The disagreements identified 
by some sources included "the amount of time that can elapse between the moment 
either side demands the right to make an inspection and the time their inspectors are 
actually permitted access to the sites they want to examine. . . , how many people may 
perform an inspection, and which side will provide air transport to the inspection site." 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 6, 1987, at 7, col. 1. 
5. "National technical means of verification" euphemistically refers to satellite reo 
connaissance, radars, and other information collection techniques short of espionage and 
on-site inspection. 
6. Interim Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504, art. V; Treaty Between the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti· 
Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503, art. XII; 
Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, art. XV, in UNITED STATES ARMS 
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 266 
(1984). 
7. For a discussion of verification under the proposed INF treaty, see N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 9, 1987, at 26; Mendelsohn, INF Verification: A Guide for the Perplexed, ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY, Sept., 1987, at 25 [hereinafter Mendelsohn]. 
The subject of on-site inspection has been broached on other arms control fronts as 
well. For example, in negotiations to eventually conclude a comprehensive test ban 
treaty, negotiators have floated a trial balloon of placing one country's seismic sensors at 
the other country's nuclear test sites to monitor compliance with such a treaty. W. 
ROWELL, ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION, A GUIDE TO POLlCY ISSUES FOR THE 19808 59·60, 63 
(1986) [hereinafter Rowell]. The negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 
(MBFR), begun in Vienna fourteen years ago to reduce the level of conventional forces 
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, contemplate verification measures that include on·site 
inspections by an international consultative commission comprised of NATO and War· 
saw Pact representatives. See Dean, supra note 3, at 30, 32. This commission, as envi· 
sioned by the Warsaw Pact, would "carry out on-site inspection of [force] reductions and 
supervise destruction of armaments." [d. at 32. In addition, a U.S. draft chemical weap· 
ons treaty provides for on-site inspection. ROWELL, supra at 33. 
8. [d.; see Dean, supra note 3, at 25, where the author states that on-site verification 
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tions.9 During the SALT I and SALT II regimes, it was a fortui-
tous coincidence that verification technology was adequate to 
monitor compliance without resort to intrusive on-site inspec-
tions. ICBM missile silos, nuclear-armed submarines, and inter-
continental bombers were large enough to be monitored by re-
connaissance satellites, radar, and other NTM technologies. The 
advent of more stealthy weapons technologies such as the cruise 
missile tremendously complicate the verification picture, partic-
ularly when such weapons have both a conventional and nuclear 
capability, as does the cruise missile. The advanced technology 
or "stealth" bomber, the Midgetman mobile missile, and the re-
cently deployed Soviet SS-24 mobile ICBMlo are other examples 
of emerging, and in the case of the SS-24 already deployed, 
weapon systems that will impede the arms control negotiation 
process even further because of the extreme difficulty of verify-
ing compliance with any treaty which places limits on or bans 
such weapon systems. In the opinion of some, these new technol-
ogies spell the end to arms control. More optimistic appraisals of 
the future of arms control conclude that verification technologies 
will keep pace with weapons systems. But even the most ardent 
arms control advocates recognize that such weapons technologies 
herald a new era in which the now-familiar NTM verification 
regime will have to be supplemented to some extent by OS1. 
The United States for some time stated that an INF treaty 
had to include monitoring provisions that go beyond NTM ver-
ification techniques to include OS1.11 Among the OSI measures 
to be introduced are initial on-site inspections at missile operat-
ing bases and missile support facilities, followed by short-notice 
(sixteen hour) challenge inspections at those installations for a 
measures made part of an INF treaty will not only break new ground but "will be worth-
while ... for application to future arms control agreements." See also Nye, Farewell to 
Arms Control? 65 FOREIGN AFF. I, 5 (1986) ("Verification provisions for mobile or cruise 
missiles will require cooperative measures that go beyond all precedent."). 
9. See CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 22, 1987, at 8, col. 2 ("Shultz indicated that 
there are serious obstacles, especially the problem of verifying a strategic arms reduction 
["START"] agreement. He said that verifying such an agreement will be 'vastly more 
complicated' than even an INF agreement.") 
10. Soviets Deploy New Mobile Missile, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1987, at 34. 
11. That their Soviet counterparts were prepared to do the same appeared equally 
true. See Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 26, where Yuli Vorontsov, First Deputy Soviet 
Foreign Minister, is quoted as saying, "According to the U.S. proposal the inspectors will 
be sent only to the gates of the enterprises [where missiles are produced]. We propose 
that they should also be granted access inside the enterprise." 
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.thirteen year period.I2 Although OSI inspections will not include 
walk-throughs of private contractor facilities where INF missiles 
are stored, assembled, and manufactured, one private contractor 
facility, the Hercules Plant No.1 in Utah, has been specifically 
identified in the INF treaty as the U.S. missile production facil-
ity to be continuously monitored under a perimeter inspection 
scheme.Is 
While the Soviets have put their security obsessiveness on 
hold and have actually agreed to such intrusive verification mea-
sures, United States negotiators find themselves thrown on the 
horns of a dilemma. American negotiators must now shoulder 
the task of securing Senate approval of an arms control treaty 
that is arguably "adequately" verifiable/· but that is at the same 
time arguably at odds with the Constitution. In this latter con-
12. The on-site verification provisions were summarized in the N.Y. Times: 
Thirty days after the treaty goes into force, each party will have the right to 
conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities 
to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support 
equipment. These inspections shall be complete no later than 90 days after the 
treaty goes into force. 
For 13 years after the treaty goes into force, the parties shall have the right to 
inspect certain missile-production installations by means of continuous moni-
toring. Twenty such inspections per calendar year can be conducted in the first 
three years of the treaty, 15 per year for the next five years, and 10 per year in 
the last five years. 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 25. See Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 27. The author notes 
that State Department officials envisioned little need for OSI if both sides agreed to 
remove all intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles. Id. at 28. Nevertheless, 
some OSI would still be needed, according to the State Department, in order to verify 
the baseline inventory of missiles, to monitor dismantlement and destruction of missiles, 
and to monitor "suspicious activities during and after the transition to zero." Id. 
13. Article XI(6) of the INF treaty, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 25, col. 4; Protocol 
on Verification to the INF treaty, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 12, col. r. 
14. For a discussion of the "adequate verification" standard and its various mean-
ings, see ROWELL, supra note 7, at 82-91; Earle, Verification Issues from the Point of 
View of the Negotiator, in ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION, THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAKE 
IT PossmLE 14-19 (K. Tsipis, D. Hafemeister, P. Janeway eds. 1986). For the evolution of 
the Soviet position on OSI, see Utgoff, supra note 3, at 127; CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Oct. 26, 1987, at 32, col. 5 ("The Soviets ... agreed to allow up to 10 on-site inspections 
yearly, for the first five years of the [INF] treaty, of so-called 'suspect sites' - areas 
where either side suspects the other may have secreted missiles or continued to build 
weapons in violation of an INF treaty"); CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 6, 1987, at 7, col. 
1 ("The US was demanding 15 inspections a year for 10 years; the Soviets wanted 10 
inspections a year for three years"); Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 26, where the author 
quotes General Secretary Gorbachev as stating, "Verification of the destruction or limi-
tation of arms should be carried out both by national technical means and through on-
site inspections." See also LmRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
VERIFYING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: THE SOVIET VIEW (1987). 
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nection, OSI poses at least two constitutional problems. The 
first concerns the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against war-
rantless and unreasonable searches.15 Given the heavy involve-
ment of the private sector in the development, testing, and pro-
duction of nuclear weapons systems for the U.S. Department of 
Defense, a significant constitutional question is raised implicat-
ing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches. The incorporation of on-demand, on-site inspection 
provisions in an arms control treaty will make life very compli-
cated for the Reagan administration. 
A second constitutional problem stemming from on-demand 
is that OSI measures under either an INF or any other arms 
control treaty concerns the delegation of Executive Branch au-
thority to agents of a foreign government to conduct warrantless, 
on-site inspections on U.S. territory. Inspections conducted by 
Soviet officials at private commercial premises located in' the 
United States will be tantamount to the exercise of governmen-
tal authority within the United States by persons not officers or 
agents of the Executive Branch of the United States, thus rais-
ing an improper delegation issue. Is a search of private property 
by Soviet agents consistent with the Fourth Amendment? Is 
such a search consistent with Article II's requirement that the 
Executive Branch alone be responsible for ensuring that the 
laws of the United States are faithfully executed? 
The following pages outline these two constitutional 
problems and discuss the thorny difficulties they pose for arms 
control negotiators generally. The Fourth Amendment question 
is considered first. 16 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING 
POWER 
To what extent is the treaty-making power of the United 
15. u.S. CONST. amend IV. 
16. Writing in 1958 before the advent of NTM (i.e., reconnaissance satellites and 
related electronic means of verification), Professor Louis Henkin addressed these two 
issues, as well as other constitutional problems raised by arms control treaties, such as 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See L. HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL 
AND INSPECTION IN AMERICA (1958) [hereinafter HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL]. Because virtu-
ally all controlling case law on administrative searches postdates Professor Henkin's 
work, I update his analysis here. See id. at 67-75. With regard to the delegation question, 
Professor Henkin does not see any serious constitutional problem. See id. at 56, 114-15. 
To the extent such delegation is to Soviet officials rather than to an international body, I 
disagree for the reasons discussed below. 
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States limited by the Bill of Rights? The starting point for any 
such inquiry is, of course, Article VI of the Constitution, the 
Supremacy Clause, which provides in part, "This Constitution, 
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land . . . . "17 
At an early date arguments were advanced that treaties 
were not subject to any constitutional prohibitions or limitations 
on governmental power.IS This argument was premised on a very 
close reading of the text of the Supremacy Clause, where "Laws" 
have to be made pursuant to the Constitution, but where trea-
ties are made under "the Authority of the United States." In the 
view of some, this different textual treatment was not insignifi-
cant. Indeed, to many, this disparate treatment suggested that 
treaties were not subject to the restrictions on governmental 
power contained in the Constitution. Professor Louis Henkin 
has elaborated: 
One can suggest reasons why the Framers might have intended 
not to subject treaties to any constitutional limitations. They 
might have thought that in its international relations the 
United States should be equal and sovereign, not hampered by 
restraints that limit what the federal government can do within 
the national family. It might have appeared particularly unac-
ceptable that an individual be able to assert his particular 
grievance in order to have a treaty declared unconstitutional 
by the courts, frustrating important national interests and in-
vite perhaps grave international consequences.19 
Notwithstanding this cogent argument for having a treaty-
making power free of constitutional restrictions, the view that 
the treaty-making power is subject to constitutional limitations 
has prevailed. It first gained acceptance from the Supreme Court 
in Geofroy v. Riggs/o where, in dicta, Justice Field stated that 
"[t]he treaty power ... is in terms unlimited except by those 
restraints which are found in that instrument [the Constitution] 
against the action of the government. . . . It would not be con-
tended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitu-
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
18. See L. HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION. 137-38 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS]. 
19. HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 138-39 (footnotes omitted). 
20. 13 U.S. 258 (1890). 
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tion forbids. ."21 It was not until 1957, however, that the 
Supreme Court squarely addressed and finally resolved this 
question.22 In Reid v. Covert,23 Justice Black stated unquali-
fiedly that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power 
on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which 
is free from the restraints of the Constitution."2~ 
Although the treaty-making power is subject to the Bill of 
Rights guarantees,25 Professor Henkin has written that "[e]ven 
the 'preferred freedoms' of the First Amendment . . . are not 
absolute but are 'balanced' against, and might be outweighed by, 
important public interests,"26 suggesting that the national inter-
est in war and peace might be given conclusive weight in a legal 
contest between the First Amendment and an arms control 
treaty abridging the freedom of press. Regarding the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches, Profes-
sor Henkin has further concluded that "the national interest in 
maintaining an important disarmament system and in gaining 
inspection rights in other countries might render 'reasonable' 
some intrusive inspections of private establishments and 
records."27 Under what circumstances Professor Henkin's 
"might" becomes a "shall" is far from certain. It is clear, how-
ever, that the dimensions of the OSI scheme contemplated by 
the United States and the Soviet Union under an INF treaty 
runs up against the body of Fourth Amendment case law devel-
oped by the U.S. Supreme Court under the rubric "administra-
tive searches." 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The protective sweep of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution is broad, applying not only to searches and seizures 
intended to ferret out evidence of a crime but generally to any 
21. Geofroy v. Riggs, 13 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). 
22. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 18, 
at 139-40; J. NOWAK, R ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 202-03 (1983). 
23. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court issued no opinion. In delivering the judgment, Jus-
tice Black was joined by three other Justices, but none of the other Justices questioned 
his analysis. 
24. 354 U.S. at 16. 
25. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 254 ("In principle, then, the Bill of 
Rights limits foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations as it does other federal 
activities.") 
26. Id. at 254-55 (footnotes omitted). 
27. Id. at 255 (footnote omitted). 
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governmental intrusion on private property.28 Businesses as well 
as residences enjoy the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
This was plainly acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
See v. City of Seattle:29 
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a con-
stitutional right to go about his business free from unreason-
able official entries upon his private commercial property. The 
businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the deci-
sion to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be 
made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official 
authority evidenced by a warrant. 30 
While recognizing that commercial establishments also 
come under the Fourth Amendment's protective umbrella, the 
"probable cause" showing for issuing a warrant to conduct an 
administrative search is less stringent than the showing of prob-
able cause required before a warrant will issue in a criminal con-
text.31 Administrative search warrants may be issued, for exam-
ple, authorizing an area search upon a showing that the 
condition of the entire area is in violation of some health or 
safety regulation.32 The issuance of administrative search war-
rants does not "depend upon specific knowledge of the condition 
of the particular dwelling,"33 thereby setting administrative 
search warrants apart from the specific, particularized probable 
cause showing required in order to obtain a search warrant in 
the criminal setting. The See decision, together with its compan-
ion case, Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,3. thus 
greatly reduced the showing of probable cause needed to secure 
an administrative search warrant from that required in criminal 
cases.35 The Supreme Court added that since the controlling 
28. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530-34 (1967). See 
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to 
Camara and See? 50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1975); McManis & McManis, Structuring Ad-
ministrative Inspections: Is There Any Warrant for a Search Warrant? 26 AM. U.L. REV. 
942 (1977); LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara 
and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 1. For references to a number of other articles analyzo 
ing the Camara decision, see J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.3, at 356 n.14 (1982) 
[hereinafter HALL}. 
29. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
30. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967). 
31. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39. 
32.Id. 
33.Id. 
34. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
35. See HALL, supra note 28, at 357-58; Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory 
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standard is one of reasonableness, there is no constitutional pro-
hibition against prompt, warrantless administrative inspections 
in emergency situations.36 Foreshadowing future case law devel-
opments, the Court also suggested in the See opinion that "ac-
cepted regulatory techniques [such] as licensing programs prior 
to operating a business" might escape the warrant requirement 
altogether.37 
Within five years of the Camara and See decisions, the con-
tours of a "regulated industry" exception to the warrant require-
ment began to take shape, although this exception got off on a 
left-footed start. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States,38 the Supreme Court struck down a warrantless search of 
a catering business by federal agents who had probable cause to 
believe that a violation of federal liquor laws had occurred 
there.39 Answering the question reserved in See whether war-
rantless searches of a licensed business were permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment, in a dissent, Chief Justice Burger noted 
that although they were dealing with the liquor industry, "long 
subject to close supervision and inspection,"40 Congress had not 
set a standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures that 
included forcible entries without a warrant.41 Instead, the Court 
found, Congress resolved the issue by making it an offense for a 
licensee to refuse entry to an inspector.42 
Two years after the Colonnade Catering decision, and in an 
apparent about-face, the Court handed down its decision in Bis-
well v. United States.43 In Biswell, the Court approved the war-
rantless search of business premises owned by a pawnbroker 
who was also a federally licensed gun dealer.44 The Court rea-
soned that "[w]hen a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively 
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so 
with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and am-
and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since 
Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011 (1973). 
36. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. The Court cited cases involving seizure of unwhole-
some food and the summary destruction of tubercular cattle. [d. 
37. 387 U.S. at 546. 
38. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
39. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970). 
40. 397 U.S. at 77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). 
44. Biswell v. United States, 406 U.S. at 316-17. 
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munition will be subject to effective inspection."45 
The Colonnade-Biswell pronouncements on the regulated 
industry exception to the administrative warrant requirement 
received a resounding judicial imprimatur in 1981 in Donovan v. 
Dewey.46 In that case the Court was asked to pass on the consti-
tutionality of section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act of 197747 which authorized warrantless mine inspec-
tions by federal inspectors at regular intervals to insure compli-
ance with mine safety and health standards. In Dewey, a mine 
owner refused a federal inspector permission to complete his in-
spection of the owner's mine without a warrant. On appeal the 
Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of section 
103(a)'s "right of entry to, upon, or through any coal or other 
mine" without any advance notice,48 against the challenge that it 
was violative of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches.49 Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall 
first explained that the "[g]reater latitude to conduct warrant-
less inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the 
expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property 
enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity ac-
corded an individual's home . . . . "50 Citing the Court's Colon-
nade and Biswell decisions in support, and distinguishing the 
Court's opinion in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. where the Court 
invalidated a warrantless Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) inspection scheme,51 Justice Marshall had no quarrel 
45. Id. at 316. Considering the factual similarity of Biswell and Colonnade Catering, 
the difference in results may be attributable to the change in Court personnel since the 
Colonnade decision. Joining the Court since Colonnade Catering were Justices Rehn-
quist, Blackmun, and Powell. See also Biswell, 406 U.S. at 318 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
46. 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
47. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1982). 
48.Id. 
49. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 596, 606 (1981). See Comment, Administrative 
Searches Since Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.: Probable Cause Requirements for Nonrou-
tine Administrative Searches, 70 GEO. L.J. 1183 (1982); Annot., 69 L. Ed. 2d 1078 (1982). 
50. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598-99. 
51. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). In that case, the Court invalidated a provision of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act that permitted warrantless inspections of all commercial 
premises subject to OSHA requirements. Troubled by the sweeping coverage of that Act 
(generally applicable to businesses engaged in interstate commerce), coupled with its 
lack of standards to guide inspectors either in their selection of businesses to be in-
spected, the Court was compelled to conclude that that Act "devolves almost unbridled 
discretion upon executive and administrative officers ... as to when to search and whom 
to search." 436 U.S. at 323. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a warrant was re-
quired in order to conduct an OSHA inspection, noting that some statutes "apply only to 
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with the reasons advanced by Congress for authorizing warrant-
less mine inspections. The mining industry being one of the 
most hazardous in the United States,t'2 a system of warrantless 
inspections was deemed necessary because advance notice of an 
inspection would allow safety hazards to be concealed. Inspec-
tions would therefore fail as a deterrent.1i3 In addition, because 
the Act was tailored to one industry and because the regulation 
imposed was sufficiently pervasive, mine owners were on notice 
that they would be subject to inspection.1i4 Moreover, in view of 
the statutory requirement that all surface mines be inspected bi-
annually and that all underground mines be inspected four 
times annually, "the Act establishe[d] a predictable and guided 
federal regulatory presence, . . . rather than leaving the fre-
quency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked discretion 
of Government officers."1i1i Accordingly, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed Congress' broad power to authorize warrantless inspec-
tions of a closely regulated industry. liS 
a single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-
Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply." Id. at 321. See Rader, OSHA 
Warrants and Administrative Probable Cause, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 97 (1981); Rothstein, 
OSHA Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 1979 DUKE L.J. 63; Shipley, War-
rantless Administrative Inspections After Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 81 
(1979); Comment, Defining Contours of OSHA Inspection Warrants, 48 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 105 (1981); Comment, When Are Administrative Inspections Warranted? 50 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 231 (1979). 
52. 452 U.S. at 602 n.7. 
53. Id. at 602-03. 
54. Id. at 603. "[Ilt is the pervasivness and regularity of the federal regulation that 
ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 606. 
55. Id. at 604. See also NY v. Burger - US -, 96 L Ed.2d 601, 614, 619 (1987). 
56. In the course of the Dewey opinion the court intimated that persons doing busi-
ness in a pervasively regulated industry impliedly consent to warrantless searches of 
their premises: "The Act itself clearly notifies the operator that inspections will be per-
formed on a regular basis. Moreover, the Act and the regulations issued pursuant to it 
inform the operator of what health and safety standards must be met in order to be in 
compliance with the statute." 452 U.S. at 605. But see Collins & Hurd, Warrantless 
Administrative Searches; It's Time to Be Frank Again, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 189, 203 (1984) 
("such awareness is not the functional equivalent of implied consent because its source is 
merely the adoption of the legislation, not the informed choice by one subject to the 
legislation"). 
Not surprisingly, one of the most highly regulated industries in the United States is 
the nuclear power and materials industry. Congress has authorized the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission to promulgate regulations providing for inspections of nuclear power 
activities. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(0) (1982). The Commission has created a comprehensive in-
spection scheme permitting unannounced, warrantless facility inspections at reasonable 
times. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 21.41, 21.51, 30.51-.53. 34.28. 40.61-.63, 50.70-.72, 60.71-.73, 
71.62-.63, 75.42. At least one district court has sustained the validity of such unan-
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The common theme for sustaining warrantless administra-
tive searches in the administrative search decisions has been the 
"long tradition of close governmental supervision and inspec-
tion"117 which diminishes whatever reasonable expectations of 
privacy a business might have. "[A] business, by its special na-
ture and voluntary existence," the Court has written, "may open 
itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely pri-
vate context."IIS "Certain industries have such a history of gov-
ernment oversight," the Court has added, "that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock 
of such an enterprise."119 Thus, because of the pervasive govern-
mental regulation of many businesses, the government has its 
thumb on the scales when courts are asked to strike the balance 
between the privacy interests of businesses and the govern-
ment's need for conducting warrantless inspections. In Marshall 
v. Barlow's, Inc., the Court explained that "[t]he reasonableness 
of a warrantless [administrative] search ... will depend upon 
the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each 
statute."so The upshot of the Colonnade-Bi~well-Dewey line of 
cases is that warrantless searches are deemed by the courts to be 
more necessary, less intrusive, and thus less objectionable when 
conducted within closely regulated industries. 
In short, the linchpins that emerge from these decisions for 
sustaining warrantless searches of heavily regulated industries 
are the certainty and regularity of such inspections. The require-
ment of certainty goes to a business owner's reduced expectation 
of privacy, thus validating a warrantless search.s1 The require-
ment of regularity serves as a check on arbitrary searches by 
government oflicials.S2 Nevertheless, while recognizing Congress' 
nounced, warrantless inspections as reasonable and therefore not violative of the Fourth 
Amendment. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. Radiation Technology, Inc., 519 F. 
Supp. 1266, 1288-91 (D.N.J. 1981). 
57. Colonnade Catering, 397 U.S. at 74. 
58. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977). 
59. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 313. 
60. 436 U.S. at 321. The Court added that "[slome ... statutes ... apply only to a 
single industry, where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Bis-
well exception to the warrant requirement could apply." Id. 
61. The danger in this argument, however, is that searches may be validated for no 
reason other than that they are a regular occurrence, which is nothing more than a boot-
strap argument. 
62. See, e.g., BalHo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753, 765-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 
U.S. 1252 (1984); Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1078-79 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
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broad power to regulate enterprises engaged in interstate com-
merce, the Court warned that inspections of commercial prop-
erty may be unreasonable if "unnecessary for the furtherance of 
federal interests" or if their occurrence is "so random, infre-
quent, or unpredictable that the owner . . . has no real expecta-
tion that his property will from time to time be inspected by 
government officials. "63 
Against this backdrop, the following discussion examines 
the extent to which the U.S. defense industry fits under the 
"closely regulated industry" rubric.54 
IV. A PROFILE OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Considering the intimate link between U.S. national secur-
ity and the activities of the U.S. defense industry, there can be 
little question that the U.S. defense industry falls squarely 
within the closely regulated industry exception to the adminis-
trative warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In broad 
brush, the U.S. nuclear defense industry contracts with two Ex-
ecutive Branch departments, the Department of Defense (DOD), 
which oversees the design, testing, and manufacture of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems, and the Department of Energy (DOE), 
which supervises nuclear warhead design and production.65 The 
DOD and DOE work hand in glove, with the DOD setting the 
characteristics and requirements for nuclear warheads and the 
DOE meeting those specifications.66 Unlike the delivery systems 
which are in the main designed and manufactured at private 
contract facilities, nuclear warheads are designed, tested, and 
manufactured at U.S. government owned-contractor operated 
(GO CO) complexes.67 The rationale for GOCO complexes is that 
the Atomic Energy Act of 195466 classified as "Restricted 
63. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599. 
64. The only other industry that could lay claim to more pervasive government 
oversight is the nuclear energy industry. 
65. II T. COCHRAN, W. ARKIN, R. NORRIS AND M. HOENING, NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
DATABOOK, U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION 3, 5, 146 (1987) [hereinafter U.S. Nu-
CLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION]. 
66. [d. at 3. 
67. U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 5. The Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, provides that the United States shall be the owner of all pro-
duction facilities which produce special nuclear materials, such as plutonium and ura-
nium 235. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2061(a), 2014(aa) (1982). 
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296. 
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Data"69 all information concerning the design or manufacture of 
nuclear warheads.70 To that end, all facilities involved in the de-
velopment, testing, and production of nuclear warheads are 
owned by the United States. 
Nuclear warhead components are manufactured at seven 
DOE-owned facilities.71 Seven private contractors currently op-
erate at those seven facilities.72 
All contracts for the research, development, or production 
of "special nuclear material" (e.g., plutonium and uranium 
235)73 must contain a provision submitting all activities of the 
contractor to inspection by DOE employees.7• The nuclear and 
non-nuclear components of a nuclear warhead are sent to the 
Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas, where final assembly of the 
warhead is done by the Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason CO.711 The 
complete disassembly of a nuclear weapon permanently with-
drawn from the weapons stockpile also occurs at the Pantex 
Plant.76 The operations at the Pantex Plant would make it the 
object of special interest to Soviet on-site inspectors. 
The thousand of contractors and subcontractors who design, 
test, and produce nuclear weapon delivery systems for the DOD 
stand in sharp contrast to the comparatively few contractors 
who perform similar functions for the DOE in nuclear warhead 
production." Despite the tremendous number of DOD contrac-
69. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended defines "Restricted Data" as all 
data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the pro-
duction of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the pro-
duction of energy . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1982). 
70. See U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 146. 
71. The seven weapons production facilities are the Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Col-
orado; Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the Savannah River Plant, Aiken, South Caro-
lina; the Mound Facility, Miamisburg, Ohio; the Pinellas Plant, St. Petersburg, Florida; 
the Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri; and the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas. 
U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 12, Table 1.3. 
72. U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 28, Table 2.1 
Rockwell International, Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, CO; Martin Marietta Energy 
Systems, Inc., Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, TN; E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company, Sa-
vannah River Plant, Aiken, SC; Monsanto Research Corp., The Mound Facility, Miamis-
burg, OH; General Electric Co., Pinellas Plant, St. Petersburg, FL; Bendix Corp., Kansas 
City Plant, Kansas City, MO; Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc., Pantex Plant, 
Amarillo, TX. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1982). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2061(b)(2)(B) (1982). 
75. U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 40. 
76. U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 40, 41. 
77. See U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, Appendix A, for a list 
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tors and subcontractors,78 DOD contract performance at pri-
vately-owned facilities is closely regulated. For example, Con-
gress has enacted provisions governing major weapon systems, 
such as those designed to deliver nuclear warheads, obligating 
defense contractors to guarantee design, manufacture, and per-
formance requirements of the particular weapon system for 
which they are responsible.79 In addition, Congress has author-
ized plant inspections of all defense contractors performing 
under a cost or a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.80 Of course, the 
of all private contractors and subcontractors involved in nuclear warhead research, de-
velopment, and production for the DOE. 
78. See U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 146 (DOD contracts 
with "thousands of contractors and subcontractors producing components and integrated 
systems and providing services"). The defense contractors responsible for the develop-
ment and production of the more important nuclear weapon delivery systems include 
Boeing and General Dynamics, both of which are responsible for developing and manu-
facturing the cruise missile; Northrop International and General Electric, which are re-
sponsible for developing the stealth bomber (known euphemistically as the advanced 
technology bomber or ATB); Martin Marietta, which is producing the MX missile; Gen-
eral Dynamics, which manufactures the Trident submarine; and Rockwell International, 
which is responsible for developing and manufacturing the defensive and offensive avion-
ics for the B-1B bomber. See T. COCHRAN, W. ARKIN, M. HOENIG, NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
DATABOOK, U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILITIES 124, 161,162, 173 (1984) [hereinafter 
U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILITIES); C. CAMPBELL, NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACT BOOK 92-
93, 104, 108-09 (1984). 
It has been estimated that critical components of an intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile (e.g., high-precision gyroscopes, gas turbines, liquid-propellant rocket engines, air-
frames) are manufactured at some 200 plants within the United States. WIESNER, In-
spection for Disarmament, in ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES FOR THE PUBLIC 4-7, 4-8 (L. Henkin 
ed. 1961). The number of plants in the United States with the potential for manufactur-
ing such critical components was established to be about 70,000 in 1947. Id. at 4-8. In 
1984 researchers for the Natural Resources Defense Council identified the following 
number of major contractors involved in the production of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems: 
Advanced Technology Bomber 5 prime contractors 
Minuteman II ICBM 9 prime contractors 
Minuteman III ICBM 8 prime contractors 
MX ICBM 32 prime contractors 
Trident I C-4 Missile 4 prime contractors 
B-1B Bomber 41 major subcontractors 
Ground-Launched and Sea-Launched Cruise Missile 19 prime contractors 
Air-Launched Cruise Missile 28 major subcontractors 
Pershing 1a Intermediate-Range Missile 10 prime contractors 
Pershing II Intermediate-Range Missile 5 prime contractors 
U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILITIES, supra at 113, 116, 124, 142, 161, 162, 173, 176, 
289, 293. This list does not include the dozens of subcontractors involved in the manu-
facture of components for each of these weapon systems. 
79. 10 U.S.C. § 2403 (Supp. IV 1986). 
80. 10 U.S.C. § 2313(a). That section provides: 
An agency named in section 2303 of this title [the Department of the 
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mere fact that Congress has authorized plant inspections of de-
fense contractor facilities does not answer the question whether 
warrantless inspections are permitted. In Barlow's, Inc., for ex-
ample, Congress had given the Occupational Safety and Health 
Commission a comparably broad mandate to search business 
premises for health and safety violations hazardous to employ-
ees.81 Yet in Barlow's, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down that 
authorization to the extent it purported to authorize warrantless 
inspections.82 The extent to which warrantless inspections may 
be conducted at defense contractor facilities is considered in the 
next part of the article. 
V. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AT DEFENSE CONTRACTOR FACILITIES 
Given the highly regulated nature of the defense industry, 
coupled with the important national interest in successfully ne-
gotiating to conclusion and subsequently enforcing arms control 
treaties, are warrantless administrative inspections of defense 
contractor premises reasonable when conducted for the purpose 
of ensuring compliance with an arms control treaty? To the ex-
tent OSI entails verification that the fissile material is removed 
from a nuclear warhead and that the nuclear warhead is de-
Army, Navy, and Air Force, inter alia] is entitled, through an authorized rep-
resentative [emphasis added], to inspect the plant and audit the books and 
records of [such contractor]. 
See also 10 U.S.C. § 2406 (Supp. IV 196), requiring a defense contractor to make availa-
ble "in a timely manner to any authorized representative of the head of an agency 
records of the contractor's cost and pricing data . . . • " 
Of course, governmental functions are from time to time delegated to the private 
sector. For example, in Stauffer Chemical Co. v. E.P.A., 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981), a 
challenge was made to the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act which provides that the Administrator of the EPA "or his authorized rep-
resentative ... shall have a right of entry" to conduct Clean Air Act inspections. 42 
U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2). The Tenth Circuit held that private contractors hired by the EPA to 
conduct these inspections are not "authorized representatives" within the meaning of 
that Act. 647 F.2d at 1079. Contra Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. E.P.A., 658 
F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981). See also United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165 
(1984). 
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). 
82. 436 U.S. 307, 325. If a defense contractor refuses access to its business records, a 
subpoena may be issued by the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency requiring 
production of such records. 10 U.S.C. § 2313(d)(1) (1985). A refusal to obey must then be 
enforced in an appropriate federal district court. [d. § 2313(d)(2). Conceivably, a defense 
contractor could move to quash the subpoena arguing that the request is overly broad or 
that the government must make some showing of cause. Compare Bowsher v. Merck & 
Co., 460 U.S. 824 (1983), where the Court concluded that the right of access to business 
records was not unlimited. 
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stroyed, such inspections would presumably take place at GOCO 
facilities where nuclear warheads are designed, tested, produced, 
and retired.s3 Inspections at GOCO nuclear warhead facilities ar-
guably present no Fourth Amendment issues insofar as searches 
of the facility, as opposed to searches of the person, are con-
cerned for the simple reason that no private property interests 
are at stake. To the extent that private contractors operating at 
GOCO facilities have any colorable Fourth Amendment claim, it 
would seem limited to searches of the person. Even then, how-
ever, considering the extremely sensitive nature of the defense 
contracting work they perform, it might be fairly concluded that 
all contractor personnel have impliedly consented to searches 
once they enter a GOCO nuclear warhead facility. In view of the 
numerous decisions sustaining airport searches as implied con-
sent searches,s4 the rationale of those decisions would seem to 
apply a fortiori to GOCO nuclear warhead facilities.s5 
In contrast with the DOE's close relationship with its pri-
vate contractors, the DOD has entered into nuclear weapon de-
fense contracts with thousands of defense contractors and sub-
contractors who perform much of their work at privately-owned 
facilities. Searches at privately-owned facilities raise at least two 
constitutional questions. The first turns on the regularity of such 
inspections, identified by the Supreme Court as being a critical 
check on arbitrary government inspections. On-demand, intru-
sive OSI without prior notice is deemed essential from a confi-
dence-building perspective, given the considerable risks of 
speedy alteration or disguise. But while the element of surprise 
is critical to effective OSI, preserving that element is clearly at 
83. u.s. NUCLEAR WARHEAD PRODUCTION, supra note 65, at 5. 
84. See e.g., United States v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 
917 (1981); United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 
(1973). For a criticism of the implied consent theory when applied in the context of 
airport security searches, see 4 W. LAFAVE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 10.6 (1987) [herein-
after LAFAVE]. 
85. Searches of civilians at military installations have been analogized to the airport 
search cases. See e.g., United States v. Miles, 480 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1973). Searches at 
military installations have also been upheld on an implied consent theory. See e.g., 
United States v. Ellis, 547 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mathews, 431 F. 
Supp. 70 (W.D. Okla. 1976); See also United States v. Burrows, 396 F. Supp. 890 (D. Md. 
1975) (the greater the national interest involved, as in the case of a top-security installa-
tion, the more the courts may weigh that factor in the scales when deciding whether the 
constitutional right against unreasonable searches has been violated). For a criticism of 
this implied consent theory in the context of military installations, see LAFAVE, supra 
note 84, § 1O.7(d), at 49. 
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odds with ensuring some measure of certainty and regularity of 
inspections; two factors cited by the Supreme Court in Dewey as 
critical checks on arbitrary governmental intrusions and there-
fore key elements to sustaining the warrantless inspection 
schemes such as the one before the Court in that case. Having 
the parties identify specific defense industry facilities of the 
other party that would be subject to inspection would ameliorate 
the constitutional objection that warrantless searches of such fa-
cilities are not sufficiently certain.86 But a restricted site inspec-
tion regime could prove futile because operations can always be 
covertly relocated. In addition, specific facility identification by 
one part of the other's facilities runs the genuine risk of compro-
mising intelligence gathering sources and capabilities. 
In Dewey the Court also made reference to warrantless in-
spections that may be constitutional if necessary "for the fur-
therance of federal interest."87 What the precise metes and 
bounds of this vague prescription are is impossible to tell. Ar-
guably, arms control measures are one such federal interest. But 
this standard, if one can call it that, proves far too much. It is 
virtually impossible to draw any constitutional line over which 
the government may not cross employing such a "federal inter-
est" test.88 By definition, any interest of the United States is a 
"federal interest." 
Even assuming the constitutionality of warrantless on-site 
inspections at defense contractor facilities under the "closely 
regulated industry" exception to the warrant requirement, a fur-
ther complication of constitutional dimensions is presented by 
warrantless on-site inspections under an INF or other arms con-
trol treaty. That complication concerns keeping such inspections 
limited to the defense industry. Even if the number of annual 
on-demand, on-site inspections are capped - as they are under 
the INF treaty - as long as the location of inspections is not 
likewise restricted to private or public facilities dedicated to nu-
8S. Article Xl(S) of the INF treaty identifies the Hercules Plant No.1, located in 
Magna, Utah, as one private contractor facility to be continuously monitored. N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 25, col. 4. However, inspections at this plant will be non-intrusive. 
The Protocol on Verification provides that inspection activities at this plant shall be 
portal/exit inspections only. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 25, col. 5. Hercules, Inc., is 
responsible for production of the Pershing II propulsion system. U.S. NUCLEAR F-oRCES 
AND CAPABILITIES, supra note 78, at 293. The Pershing II is the U.S. INF missile subject 
to removal and destruction under the treaty. 
87. 452 U.S. 594, 599. 
88. The Court has, of course, drawn just such a line in its Barlow's decision. 
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clear weapons development or manufacture, warrantless 
searches might be conducted at private business premises not 
within the closely regulated industry exception. Whether by de-
sign or blind luck, INF negotiators created in effect two catego-
ries of facilities which will be subject to inspection. If these cate-
gories are closely adhered to, the potential problem of 
inspections at business premises not within the closely regulated 
industry exception might be obviated. The first category in-
cludes declared facilities, that is, those facilities that are in-
volv.ed in the deployment, production, or testing of INF missiles, 
all of which - with the exception of the Hercules Plant - are 
government owned and operated.B9 (These facilities have been 
identified through a Memorandum of Understanding in which 
each side has specified all such facilities of the other.)90 The sec-
ond category would cover so-called "suspect" sites, that is, "ad-
ditional facilities which could be used for INF missiles in an un-
authorized waY,"91 such as nuclear weapon storage facilities. In 
order to prevent the "suspect" site category from becoming an 
opening wedge for searches throughout the entire United States, 
the two sides have characterized a suspect site as a "missile sup-
port facility," and includes ballistic missile production and stor-
age facilities,92 facilities which are government owned or if pri-
vately owned would likely fall within the closely regulated 
industry exception to the warrant requirement. 
Any suggestion by the United States to restrict searches to 
government-owned or government-controlled facilities only - as 
it has done in its draft chemical weapons treaty93 - would 
clearly have been a nonstarter for the Soviet Union, given the 
congruence of the Soviet government and the Soviet defense in-
dustry. But the effort made by the negotiators of the INF treaty 
to circumscribe OSI by limiting intrusive inspections to govern-
ment owned and operated facilities, thereby attempting to save 
it from possible constitutional infirmities, may in the end prove 
89. Under Article XI(6) of the treaty, the Hercules Plant No. 1 is the only such 
declared facility. 
90. See Article X(4), N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 25, col. 2; Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1987, 
at 3, col. 5. 
9!. ARMS CONTROL TODAY 3 (Oct. 1987) (interview with Paul H. Nitze, special ad-
viser to President Reagan on arms control matters). Article XI(3) of the INF treaty per-
mits OSI at "missile support facilities," which are defined in Article II(9) as including 
any "launcher storage facility." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 24, 25. 
92. Article II(9), N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 24. 
93. See ROWELL, supra note 7, at 33. 
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to be OSl's undoing. From the perspective of confidence-build-
ing and deterring violations, carte blanche, on-demand OSI any-
where within the territory of the United States and the Soviet 
Union would be not only desirable but essential. Any inspection 
regime which falls short of permitting unrestricted access any-
where in the territory of either treaty signatory arguably would 
render on-site inspections virtually worthless as an arms control 
verification method on any level - detection, deterrence, or con-
fidence-building.94 At the same time, however, such an unbridled 
inspection scheme would run a substantial risk of being in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment as being neither regular nor cer-
tain in application, the constitutional minima identified by the 
Supreme Court for sustaining warrantless inspections, and then 
only for warrantless inspections of closely regulated businesses.95 
A warrantless, on-site inspection scheme that covered all busi-
nesses, closely regulated and not, would fail to pass constitu-
tional muster.96 
Even assuming the constitutionality of such warrantless 
searches under the Fourth Amendment, a residual constitutional 
question is whether agents of a foreign government may execute 
such warrantless inspections without usurping the constitution-
ally assigned functions of ensuring that the laws of the U.S. are 
executed by the Executive Branch. 
VI. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES BY SOVIET INSPECTORS 
Article II of the Constitution grants to the President the ex-
ecutive power of the government, "the general administrative 
control of those executing the laws, including the power of ap-
pointment and removal of executive officers - a conclusion con-
94. See Arms-Treaty Backers Fear Senate Changes, Wall St. J. ,Dec. 9,1987, at 1, 
col. 1. 
95. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the Court struck down a warrantless inspection 
scheme created by Congress under the Occupational Safety and Health Act which per-
mitted such inspections of any business subject to OSHA regulations (i.e., any business 
affecting interstate commerce). The Court found the closely regulated business exception 
to be inapposite, noting that "few businesses can be conducted without having some 
effect on interstate commerce." 436 U.S. at 314. 
The Court's conclusion in Barlow's casts considerable doubt on the continued vital-
ity of Professor Henkin's conclusion that "Congress may impose inspection - a limited 
regulation - on all industrY as 'necessarY and proper' to make effective the regulation of 
armaments under the treaty power." HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL, supra note 16, at 75. 
96. See Freeman v. Blair, 793 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1986) (warrant required to conduct 
inspections unless some recognized exception applies). 
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firmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed."97 The power to appoint subordinates was deemed es-
sential in order to carry out the day-to-day business of govern-
ment,98 hence the authority given under the Appointments 
Clause.99 The execution of the laws of the United States is the 
sole responsibility of the President and his duly appointed dele-
gates. This responsibility includes ensuring that the treaty obli-
gations of the United States, which are also the supreme law of 
the land,loo are faithfully carried out. 
No legal fiction could alter the undeniable fact that Soviet 
officials selected by the Soviet Union to conduct on-site inspec-
tions of U.S. defense contractor facilities are not officers, agents, 
or representatives of the government of the United States. It 
would be patently absurd, not to mention politically suicidal, to 
contend otherwise. Yet, unless Soviet inspectors are cloaked in 
an Executive Branch mantle, there is an insoluable dilemma. On 
the one hand, contending that Soviet officials have a limited 
right of access to U.S. defense contractor facilities to monitor 
American compliance with an arms control treaty arguably con-
stitutes an improper delegation of Executive Branch power to 
agents of a foreign government because they would be con-
ducting a Fourth Amendment search, an Executive Branch func-
tion.lOl On the other hand, unless Soviet inspectors are by some 
legal fiction deemed to be officers, agents, or representatives of 
the United States government, to the extent that Soviet officials 
seek entry to private property located within the United States 
to police U.S. compliance with an arms control treaty, they have 
no right of access to such property absent consent of the 
97. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926). 
98. See Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 171 (1926): "But the President alone 
and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of 
subordinates .... As he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully exe-
cuted, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part 
of his executive power he should select those who were to act for him under his direction 
in the execution of the laws [emphasis added]." 
99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Such "officers of the United States," according to 
the Supreme Court, include "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to 
the laws of the United States." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 126 (1976). Appointees 
exercising significant authority can only be appointed with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, according to the Court. Id. Arms control inspectors arguably would not fall 
within this category of appointee. 
100. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 164-65. 
101. See United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984). 
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owner.102 Considerations of political ideology aside, it is not diffi-
cult to imagine that defense contractors would be extremely re-
luctant to give their consent to such searches, considering the 
commercial and industrial secrets they would have an interest in 
protecting from disclosure to the Soviet "competition.mo3 Un-
wanted disclosure of proprietary information would certainly 
furnish reason enough for strong resistance from the U.S. de-
fense industry to uninvited and unrestricted tours by Soviet offi-
cials of their facilities. 
Whether defense contractors could be required to give their 
consent to unwelcome on-site inspections by Soviet officials as a 
. condition to being awarded a defense contract depends on 
whether such a requirement would place an unconstitutional 
condition on the award of a government contract. The standard 
102. Professor Henkin perceived the contours of this dilemma, but did not resolve it 
fully. Writing in the specific context of an arms control and disarmament regime, Profes-
sor Henkin wrote: 
[T]he United States could agree to abolish existing armies and armaments, and 
to refrain from the raising of armies, and from the manufacture, possession or 
research and development of armaments in the future. It could agree to create 
a complex international organization to provide comprehensive inspection that 
would abolish the secrecy of governmental operations, require full reporting, 
and subject government installations, activities and files to unlimited surveil-
lance, and its officials to international interrogation. Within large limits it 
could subject the activities of its citizens also to relevant, reasonable limita-
tions and surveillance like those imposed by Congress through domestic regula-
tory programs. Issues of imporper delegation could be wholly avoided if inter-
national authority, regulation and administration were brought to bear only on 
the Government of the United States rather than directly on individuals in 
the United States. 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 195-96 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
Professor Henkin then discussed the constitutional infirmities of an international organi-
zation established to police the Baruch Plan, had that Plan been implemented: 
That proposal might have given to an international authority power to regulate 
the activities not only of the Government of the United States but of mining 
companies, manufacturers, scientists, laborers, and citizens generally. A body 
with such powers and functions, it would have been argued, would be exercis-
ing governmental authority within the United States, assuming functions of 
the President and Congress. Again, constitutional objections would have been 
eliminated if the United States Government stood between the international 
authority and the individual, if the requirements of the Authority were im-
posed and enforced by the Government in the same ways as other treaty obli-
gations or the regulations of its own administrative agencies. 
Id. at 196. 
103. See HENKIN, ARMS CONTROL, supra note 16, at 94-96. The Protocol on Verifica-
tion provides that "[i]nspectors shall not disclose infromation received during inspec-
tions except with the express permission of the inspecting Party." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 
1987, at 25, col. 2 (emphasis added). This provision, of course, affords private contractors 
no protection whatsoever with regard to appropriation of trade secrets. 
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for determining whether such a consent requirement would be 
valid is whether it would "needlessly chill the exercise of basic 
constitutional rights. . . . [T]he question is whether that effect 
is unnecessary and therefore excessive."lo4 Given that there is no 
constitutional right to be awarded a government contract, a de-
fense contractor would not be put to the Hobson's choice of 
foregoing one constitutional right in order to protect another. 
Does that mean that a defense contractor could be required to 
abandon all Fourth Amendment guarantees in order to receive a 
government contract? It is arguable that such a clause would 
sweep too broadly and therefore be constitutionally excessive in 
view of the low probability that an actual arms control violation 
would be detected as a result of on-site inspection.lo5 Any 
means-end test would therefore not likely be satisfied. Neverthe-
less, considering the highly regulated character of the U.S. de-
fense industry, coupled with the fact that rejection of a govern-
ment defense contract containing a consent-to-inspection clause 
would not entail penalizing the exercise of some other constitu-
tional right, it is arguable that defense contractors could be le-
gally put to such a choice. Even though Fourth Amendment 
rights would be sacrificed under such a clause, it would have the 
salutary purpose of advancing the cause of nuclear arms control 
and disarmament by building confidence between the superpow-
ers and by deterring arms control violations. lOS Under a balanc-
ing test, the latter interests might be deemed sufficiently 
weighty to overcome any Fourth Amendment objections. 
In any event, the Fourth Amendment issue notwithstand-
ing, a defense contractor's consent to inspection by Soviet offi-
cials would not obviate the closely related constitutional ques-
tion of improper delegation of executive power to agents of a 
104. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968). 
105. See ROWELL, supra note 7, at 61-63, 151 (1986); SCOVILLE, The Application of 
Verification Tools to Control of Offensive Strategic Missiles, in ARMS CONTROL VERIFI-
CATION, THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAKE IT POSSIBLE 207 (K. Tsipis, D. Hafemeister, P. 
Janeway eds. 1986) ("On-site inspections rarely add to national technical means, but 
sometimes as a last resort they can add confidence in compliance after the consultation 
process on an ambiguous event has been exhausted.") 
106. Depending on the bargaining leverage of the private contractor, it might be 
problematic for the United States to exact a consent-to-search clause from a defense 
contractor. Given the huge amounts of money the government has invested in procuring 
weapons systems from the private sector, the defense industry is certainly not without 
some leverage and might strongly resist pressures to accede to a consent clause. That the 
United States for its part might insist upon a consent-to-search clause as a sine qua non 
of every defense contract is not beyond the realm of possibility. 
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foreign government. Even if contractual consent to search could 
be obtained from a defense contractor, governmental authority 
would still be exercised within the United States by persons 
other than officers of the United States. Defense contractors 
have no more power to cure this constitutional defect by consent 
or waiver than litigants have to confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion on a federal district court where none otherwise exists. Liti-
gants in federal court cannot consent to subject matter jurisdic-
tion where none exists; a contrary result would violate Article 
Ill's limitations on the power of the federal judiciary. By the 
same token, U.S. defense contractors cannot vest Soviet agents 
with Executive Branch power by consent; any contrary sugges-
tion would be at loggerheads with Article II's limitations on the 
power of the national executive. 
It has been suggested that placing officials of the United 
States between Soviet inspectors and defense contractors might 
be one way of salvaging an arms control on-site inspection 
scheme from constitutional infirmities.107 Still, as long as on-site 
inspections are on demand under the INF treaty/os the role of 
the Soviet players in such an inspection regime will hardly be 
indirect. On the contrary, they will trigger the inspection and 
they will conduct the inspection, even if escorted by U.S. offi-
cials. Whatever buffer is placed between defense contractor and 
Soviet official, it will be minimal at best and arguably nothing 
more than a legal fig leaf insufficient to cover its 
unconstitutionality. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Professor Henkin's balancing test for evaluating the consti-
tutionality of a treaty vis-a-vis the Bill of Rights finds some sup-
port in the Supreme Court opinion on the "pervasively regulated 
industry" exception to the warrant requirement. While warrant-
less, on-site inspections at private defense contractor facilities 
might arguably pass constitutional muster under the closely reg-
ulated industry exception to the administrative warrant require-
107. This is a suggestion made by Professor Henkin. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
supra note 18, at 195-96. The Protocol on Verification provides for in-country escorts, 
but the Soviet inspectors are given virtually free rein when conducting an inspection. See 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 26, cols. 1-2. 
108. Protocol on Verification to the lNF Treaty, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1987, at 26, 
col. 1. On-demand inspections can be made on sixteen hours' notice under the Protocol. 
ld. 
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ment, even under that exception the government has not been 
given carte blanche by the Court. Unless such warrantless 
searches are in some measure certain and regular, they would 
accord government too much discretion, thereby opening up the 
possibility for arbitrary and capricious governmental action. To 
the extent OSI is not limited by treaty to defense contractor fa-
cilities, there is a genuine risk that unannounced searches will be 
attempted at business premises that do not fall within the ad-
ministrative warrant exception, thereby running afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment. Finally, searches conducted by Soviet in-
spectors within the territory of the United States at private 
premises arguably constitute the exercise. of an Executive 
Branch function - the execution of a Fourth Amendment 
search - by persons who are not Executive Branch officers, 
agents, or employees. In sum, OSI may open two otherwise 
barred doors, the first leading to an unconstitutional delegation 
of governmental authority, the second to a serious violation of 
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches. 
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